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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Intelligence Exploitation of the President's Trip  
to the USSR

1. In accordance with your request of last autumn, I have prepared the present memorandum on certain intelligence aspects of the President's forthcoming trip to the USSR, based in part on the experience of the Vice President's trip. The major intelligence considerations, consistent with the special nature of the trip and its primary political objectives, are: (a) briefings for the President and perhaps for some members of his party, (b) local intelligence opportunities provided by the itinerary, (c) the presence of one or more intelligence officers in the President's party as observers, and (d) the briefing and debriefing of others, both in the official party and in the press entourage, for specified overt or semi-overt intelligence collection.

2. Briefings For The President. The Department of State is preparing a large number of background papers for Ambassador Bohlen and the President. In addition to this broad background preparation, the President would probably find very useful a briefing such as the one you presented to the Vice President, highlighting (a) major issues likely to be raised by Khrushchev, and (b) a few key questions of intelligence interest to be borne in mind and perhaps to be raised in his talks with Khrushchev. Depending upon the composition of the entourage and the itinerary planned, it would probably also prove useful to provide additional briefings to others, similar to those given last time to Dr. Milton Eisenhower and to Admiral Rickover.

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3. Bulky background briefing materials for use during the trip proved impractical, and are not recommended. For example, the extensive classified biographies of Soviet leaders prepared for the Vice President were not used. On the other hand, brief notes on places and especially on individuals whom the President will meet -- in particular away from Moscow -- will probably again be useful for spot briefings to the President during the trip.

4. Itinerary. Tentative plans for the trip, from 10-19 June, call for the President to leave the USSR via Irkutsk and Khabarovsk in the Far East. A proposed itinerary has already been submitted to the Soviets, but no reply has yet been received. When the itinerary is confirmed, detailed planning can be made for covering intelligence interests in the cities to be visited. The schedule should be determined soon, as the advance party is due in Moscow on 6 April and plans to go over the entire route.

5. The only specific facility that the President might wish to request visiting would be "the ICBM plant." The President might prefer not even to ask for such a visit, since the written request made for the Vice President was not answered, and since Khrushchev declined the invitation to visit such facilities in this country. On the other hand, this is the key intelligence need, and one which the President's visit offers a unique chance of inducing the Soviets to give access. Moreover, by analogy, while the Soviets declined to permit the Vice President to depart by way of the Far East, they have accepted the President's request. It would, in any case, be highly advisable for the President to include someone knowledgeable on missile production in his party since -- whether requested by us or not -- Khrushchev might decide for his own reasons to show the President a missile plant.

6. Observers. The pattern of including intelligence observers in high-level exchange visits is now well established in practice, and there is no reason to believe that the President would be placed in an awkward position by including one or more intelligence officers in his party. The Soviets do so, and they expect us to do so as a matter of course. The chief advantage is the presence of men who have an awareness of the particular gaps and requirements of intelligence. While briefing of others can cover many routine aspects of intelligence collection, special clearances and intimate knowledge of the state of our intelligence needs, some experience in the USSR, and in some cases also knowledge of the language, are necessary to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. In the Vice President's party there were three USAF intelligence officers and the undersigned. (The State Department and Secret Service officers in that group were cooperative, but did not pursue intelligence interests and opportunities.)

7. A second function which intelligence observers can perform is to provide information or advice on intelligence questions which may arise on the trip. Also, they can forward information not otherwise available (for example, a quick analysis of initial Soviet radio and press reportage on the Vice President's trip was sent so that it could be given to him in Moscow; he was quite interested and appreciative).

8. Briefing and Debriefing Others. The value of advance briefing and subsequent debriefing of a number of members of the party is substantial. Experience supports the judgment that advance briefing is essential to some forms of intelligence exploitation, and helpful to all. A few examples are: routine identification of key locations in cities visited; observations, such as lookout for missile sites; asking key questions and taking notes of conversations at "running press conferences",

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especially at factories and the like; and advance guidance on desired photography. OCR and OO are interested in getting maximum advance notice of the composition of the party in order to facilitate the briefing program. Mr. Borel is submitting a memorandum on this subject.

9. The President's Speeches. The State Department is drafting speeches, and the Agency may have opportunity through an appropriate OCB channel or through ad hoc arrangements to offer comments and advice on the President's speeches, as was done for those given by the Vice President.



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